R.A.F. Signals

From fields in France with the B.E.F. in 1940, to the jungles of Burma in 1945 by way of the country houses of England, the desert sands of the Middle East, the dark freezing skies over Germany and the Beaches of Normandy, R.A.F. signals personnel have helped provide the vital command, control, and communication network required to ensure Victory.

Technical Training Schools, both in England and abroad began producing Operators and maintenance staff to support the ever increasing range of electronic aids with women for the first time being seen to be more than capable of operating and understanding the equipment.

Increasingly women were also being used to interpret the information and provide Intelligence assessments. The use of women in all these roles allowing their male colleagues to be redeployed to more front line fighting roles.

By the end of the War, its role included both air and ground radio communications, radio aids to navigation, radio as an airborne bombing or interception aid, airborne and ground radar used for both air traffic and fighter control, electronic intelligence and electronic warfare, as well as the teleprinter, telegraph and telephone services required for the R.A.F.

THE ENEMY IS LISTENING

Much of the Signals Intelligence role involved gathering, decoding and interpretation of various radio transmissions and required close co-operation with our allies, the various RAF commands, research scientists and the Intelligence services.

The various individual pieces of information being collated under the Y services umbrella so as to provide an overall picture of the enemy disposition, the tactics employed and the technical means to defeat him.

The interception of radio transmissions did not just apply to the enemy and often their services were used to establish better radio security procedures for the R.A.F. since it was known that the German already possessed a very efficient Y service and if we could learn so much from them then they certainly could do the same.

It was established by both sides that the young fighter pilots were much more exuberant and much more likely to inadvertently pass useful intelligence over the radio waves than their slower Bomber comrades.

The various signals units by their very nature were often secret and by necessity compartmentalised even within the same service and the true extent of their skills and capabilities was not known until long after the war had ended.